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Abstract—In this paper, we present a negotiation protocol for
simultaneous task subdivision and allocation for heterogeneous
multi-robot systems. An abstraction of the concept of task
is presented that allows to apply the protocol on a variety
of tasks. The negotiation adopts Rubinstein’s alternate offers
protocol, where offers are evaluated and generated using a
heuristic search step. The protocol has been tested on computer
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-robot systems (MRS) are a very active field of
research. A variety of techniques have been proposed in
order to approach the problem of coordination in different
kinds of applications [1]. Cooperation applications can be
roughly divided in two classes: tight cooperation requires a
continuous coordination between the robots, like for instance
in box pushing and formation keeping. Loose cooperation
requires coordination at the beginning of the mission for
planning a division of labour, and at given moments of times,
when re-planning may be needed. Exploration and mapping
are typical applications. Behaviour-based [2] and schemas
[3] are examples of techniques suitable for the first class of
coordination problems, while market-based [4] and auction
[5] techniques are commonly used in the second class of
problems.
In this work, we focus in loose cooperation. In this
class of problems, a given task has to be partitioned in
sub-tasks, and sub-tasks have to be assigned to individual
team-members for being executed. Most of the coordination
techniques assume that the task subdivision step is performed
at a high-level, either by a command and control station
or by a specific team-member, and focus on the sub-task
allocation problem. This approach, although applied with
success in many applications, has two principal drawbacks:
first, it is not really distributed, since the task partitioning is
done in one place, and second, the partitioning algorithm is
usually considered outside the coordination protocol. Often,
the details of how the original task is partitioned are not given
at all. Moreover, the robots preferences and limitations are
considered only in the assignment stage, when the robots
decide whether to accept (or opt for) a task or not.
Such features do not suit our need of a fully distributed
approach that should consider robots capabilities already at
the task partitioning stage. This feature is especially impor-
tant when the robots that compose the team are of different
kinds with respect to mobility and equipment, and the tasks
they can perform thus vary significantly. The result of a task
partitioning that does not take this into consideration may
be unfeasible. The negotiation protocol we have developed
performs a simultaneous task subdivision and allocation,
taking into account robots preferences.
Our multi-robot system is not designed with a particular
task in mind. Rather, it serves as a platform for operating
in different mission scenarios. Our aim is to develop a
cooperation system that is capable of working with different
kinds of tasks (cf. Fig. 1). For this purpose, an abstract task
concept should be defined. A negotiation algorithm based
on such an abstraction allows different applications with
minimal changes.
Let us clarify that, in the context of loose cooperation,
with task we mean the object to be divided, and not the
activity to be performed on such object. For example, if the
task is surveying a given area, we are mainly interested in
partitioning the area and assigning sub-areas to the agents.
The activity the agents will have to perform and their
preferences (for instance w.r.t. their capabilities) have an
important role in the negotiation. This role is encapsulated
in the cost/reward the agents associate to the task.
Negotiations have been widely studied in the context of
socio-economic studies [6] using, amongst others, Game
Theory [7]. An example of recent application is electronic
commerce using agents [8]. The main problem with game
theory approaches is that the theoretical results obtained
refer to very simplified models that are not immediately
applicable to complex applications. The protocol we propose
is based on Rubinsteins alternate-offers protocol [9]. Since
such protocol is based on a uni-dimensional good, a search
mechanism for the best (counter)-offer had to be devised for
the protocol to be applied in real multi-dimensional tasks. To
the best of the authors knowledge, the only similar approach
has been proposed in [10] [11], where a co-evolutionary
genetic algorithm is used to negotiate the payoff matrix
of a coordination game (using a trusted third party), and
then an optimal agreement between the parts is searched for
reasoning on the matrix.
In the following, we will first present our definition of task
and how agents take into account costs and rewards to eval-
uate (sub-)tasks. Section III briefly describes Rubinstein’s
alternate offers paradigm and the negotiation protocol we
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Fig. 1. Examples of instantiation of tasks: areas, communication ranges and torques in box pushing.
have developed based on this, and its extension to the case
of more than two negotiators. Finally, Section IV describes
the tests performed on different instantiations of tasks and
analyzes the results.
II. TASKS
We define a task T as an element of a set T, T ∈ T.
An element of T is described by a set of k parameters x ∈
IPk11 ×. . .×IPkhh ,
￿
i ki = k, IPi, i = 1 . . . h, being parameters
types. Without loss of generality we can assume they are all
of the same type (in most practical cases x will be an array
of real numbers: x ∈ IRk). Then we can write T = T (x),
that is, we consider that a task T is the product of a function
that maps a set of parameters into a task: T : IPk → T. A task
T has to be divided in R subtasks: T (x) = {T1, . . . , TR}.
Each subtask Ti, i = 1..R, can in turn be described by a set
of parameters xi:
T (x) = {T1(x1), . . . , TR(xR)}
In general a good subdivision is such that there is mini-
mum overlapping between sub-tasks (ideally null), and such
that the subtasks cover the original task. That is,
Ti ∩ Tj = ￿, ∀i, j = 1 . . . R and
R￿
i=1
Ti = T
where the operators ∩,∪ : T× T → T are to be defined
according to the meaning of the task. Note that there can
be exceptions, depending on the application (for example, in
a communication relay application, the overlapping between
the range of action of two robots must not be null). Let
g : T → IR be a reward function, giving the value of a
(sub)task. Then, the function
f : IPk → IR = T ◦ g
associates a reward to a set of parameters describing a task.
We associate to a subdivision T = {T1, . . . , TR} an index
called global coverage G, that takes into account the total
coverage of the subtasks and their pair wise overlapping.
G =
R￿
r=1
f(xr)−
￿
i
￿
j ￿=i g(T (xi) ∩ T (xj))
2
Then, the problem of task subdivision can be formulated
in the following way:
Given a task T and a number R of agents, find the R sets
of parameters xi, i = 1 . . . R, such that G is maximized:
maxx1...xr (G).
Note that G is a global performance index. During the
negotiation, each robot uses its own reward function gi to
evaluate a task. Hence, the robots can give a different value
to the same task, depending on their characteristics.
A. Evaluation of a task
As mentioned earlier, during the negotiation each robot has
to evaluate the cost and reward of a given task. To this aim, it
takes into account its internal parameters to evaluate the cost
of executing the task, the start-up cost (for instance, to reach
the execution site), specific constraints (e.g. forbidden zones,
turn angles, sensors) and the general reward associated to the
task (expressed as function g).
Thus, given the complete task T, evaluation function gi of
subtask Si for agent i takes the form:
gi(Si) = g(Si) + dim(Si)− dist(posi, sitei)− C
−￿
j ￿=i dim(Si ∩ Sj)− dim(Si \ T )
where dim() is a dimension measure (e.g. area, length,
number of targets) and dist() is a distance function from
the initial position of the robot to the task execution starting
point. The last two terms are important as they define the
penalty for overlapping sub-tasks and for the part of Si
outside T . Finally, element C accounts for the constraints.
All terms can have a weight factor used for tuning the
mission-specific behavior not expressed in the equation for
simplicity. More factors can be included in function gi for
other mission-specific costs or rewards.
III. TASK NEGOTIATIONS
A given task T can be executed by a team of R robots,
after a suitable subdivision of the task has been performed,
and an assignment of the subtasks to the robots have been
established. Our aim is to perform these two actions simulta-
neously and in a distributed way. In our system, the number
of sub-tasks is determined by the number of robots willing
to participate in the negotiation. Let us first discuss the case
R = 2. We assume that robots aim at maximizing their
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the negotiation module. The search level is currently
implemented with an Evolutionary Algorithm.
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Fig. 3. Negotiation protocol. The first counteroffer is the maximum possible
for robot i. The counteroffer update tries to produce a value that is close to
a factor of δi smaller than the previous.
reward, the only limitations being their available resources
(endurance, computation power, battery consumption etc.).
Thus, in a negotiation, each agent will try to maximize its
reward by (i) trying to get the biggest possible subtask and
(ii) minimizing overlapping with other agents task. Each
agent starts proposing the biggest possible share for itself,
and reduces it until the counterpart finds it acceptable. In
this way, a good near-optimal solution can be achieved, and
global index G is optimized in a distributed way, without
even being computed explicitly (see next section).
In the alternate-offers protocol proposed by Rubinstein,
each part of the bilateral negotiation, in turn, proposes a sub-
division of a uni-dimensional good of size 1. The responder
can agree with the subdivision, or disagree with it, and in this
case it has to propose a counteroffer. The protocol assumes
that each part has a target (desired) reward, and a negotiation
cost, that makes the target reward decrease at each step,
imposing a time pressure to the reaching of an agreement.
Such protocol has interesting theoretical properties. By ap-
plying discount factors as negotiation cost, it guarantees a
termination and can forecast the final agreement, which will
be a perfect equilibrium in the sense of Game Theory. Let
the discount factors be 0 < δ1 ≤ 1 and 0 < δ2 ≤ 1, and let
yt+1 = yt · δ, t = 1 . . . n be the update rule of target share y.
Rubinstein’s theory guarantees that one perfect equilibrium
point exists such that the share y the initiator agent will get
is:
y =
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2 . (1)
If the discount factors were known to both parts, each
could know without negotiating at all which will be its
share. However, these are not immediately applicable to the
multi-dimensional case. In the uni-dimensional case, when
an agent makes a proposal p of what it would like to get,
it is immediate that the other would get 1 − p. In the
multidimensional case, given a proposal x ∈ IPk on the
whole task T0, an agent shall search the space T0\T (x)
to decide if the share it would get is acceptable and to
generate a counteroffer, since many different configurations
are possible.
Thus, we divide the negotiation in two levels: the protocol
level and the proposals evaluation and generation level (see
Fig. 2). The protocol level is governed by parameters such as
impatience to reach an agreement (time pressure as discount
factor) and desired target reward. Moreover, at each new offer
received, it estimates the other agent’s discount factor, which
is private information, in order to estimate the maximum
possible share it can expect, according to Rubinstein’s theory,
and updates its desired share accordingly. The protocol is
depicted in Fig. 3.
The proposal generation level searches the space for a
good share given a proposal from the other part, taking into
account its own resources, parameters and limitations. This
level is also responsible for updating counteroffers. In fact,
in a multi-dimensional space there are may ways it can be
updated. In this level a search procedure is implemented
that looks for the best combination of parameters x ∈ IPk
that maximizes its objective function gi. In the current
implementation, this search is performed by an Evolutionary
Algorithm, specifically a (µ,λ)-Evolutionary Strategy [12],
where µ = 1, λ = 6 and a candidate solution is an
array x ∈ IRk encoding a set task of parameters. The
update function aims at reducing the offer in such a way to
reduce the overlapping. In order to comply with Rubinstein’s
theory hypothesis, the new offer should have a dimension
dim(T t) = δ · dim(T t−1).
When an agreement has been reached, the result is a
subdivision of the original task and at the same time an
#CB
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Fig. 4. Negotiation with forbidden area (buildings contained in the blue
area). Red agent, an aerial vehicle, refuses all proposals including the no-fly
zone.
assignment of the sub-tasks. Note that one agent does not
need to know information about the private characteristics
of the team-mates. The only information it needs is their
offers, in form of an array of parameters x ∈ IPk.
A. Learning
Each time a new offer is received, both the search in the
parameters’ space for their best share and the generation
of the counteroffer are not started from scratch. Rather,
they take as starting point the last better result. In this
way, we can say that the search algorithm learns the op-
ponent’s preferences and constraints, and produces offers
that implicitly depend on them. The no-fly zone and box
pushing applications described below are an example. In both
cases, one agent is constrained to avoid certain parameters’
combinations (in one case defining a forbidden area, in the
other the maximum push force). Although the other agent is
not aware of such constraints, as they are private information
(may be result of a partial failure) it will learn to generate
offers that avoid the forbidden configurations.
Moreover, explicit learning is performed by estimating
the opponent’s discount factor. The only restriction imposed
by Rubinstein’s protocol is that is that such factor must be
constant.
B. Extending to more than two negotiators
When there are more than two agents, the proposed
negotiation protocol can be extended in several ways. It is
important to point out that the difference between a two-party
and a three-party game reflects a basic qualitative difference
between the types of processes that take place within the
negotiation. The involvement of any more than three parties,
can be seen as an extension of a three-party process [13].
Hence, let us focus on the case R = 3.
Fig. 5. Negotiation with three agents using rounds.
The simplest extension is to do negotiation rounds where
each agent, in turn, makes its proposal. At the end of the
round, if all agents are satisfied the negotiation is closed,
otherwise another round starts. In this case, each agent
considers the union of the two proposals it receives when
negotiating, as if the other two agents would form a coalition
against it and act as a single agent. In this case, the estimation
of the expected maximum share y (which determines the
termination of the negotiation, Eq. 1) is less precise, since the
combination of the two offers is not guaranteed to this shrink
by a constant factor, as requested by Rubinstein’s theory.
IV. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed pro-
tocol, we have performed several simulations with different
examples of task instantiations using the tool Webots [14].
Figure 4 shows how a hard constraint, a forbidden area,
makes the agents agree on a subdivision that exclude such
area from the part obtained by the constrained vehicle. The
subdivision of an area among three agents is depicted in
Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows an example the shares of area partitioning
between two agents. The left plot shows how the shares
the agents obtain are actually close to values predicted by
Rubinstein’s theory. The Plot on the right shows how the
overlapping task is reduced during the negotiation, and how
global coverage G is very close to the optimum value (in
this, case the total area T ). Also, note how global coverage
is maintained throughout the negotiation. In other words, the
whole area is covered by the two robots at all times.
In the communications relay experiments (Fig. 7), dim(T )
is the distance between the two points to connect, and G
is the length of the shortest path between agents obtained,
which is longer due to the presence of an obstacle (build-
ings). In this case, the vehicles negotiate positions.
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Fig. 6. Negotiation on how to partition an area. Best share and Rubinstein predictions (left). Total area T and global coverage G (right). δ1 = 0.945, δ2 =
0.955, both agents start claiming 1.
Fig. 7. Communication relays. Three ground vehicles have to position
themselves in order to guarantee communications between two fixed sta-
tions (outermost circles). In total there are five agents negotiating. Circles
represent signal range.
Table I shows that negotiations only take tho order of
seconds to conclude and that the global performance index G
is optimized. Each figure is the average of 10 runs. Note that
not always the optimum value for G is reached, but this is
due to time pressure: agents are forced to reach an agreement
soon. In applications where more precision is needed, this
can be reached by imposing less time pressure.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS.
Experiment Agents Steps Time (sec.) dim(T) G
No fly zone 2 28 1.82 0.67 0.66
Area Survey-3 3 58 2.72 0.74 0.73
Area Survey-4 4 65 3.53 0.74 0.72
Comm relay 5 9 0.36 0.90 1.02
Fig. 8. Snapshot of box pushing experiment. Two robots of different kind
(wheeled and legged) have to negotiate push position and force in order to
make the box move in a given direction. The arrows depict target direction
(black) and obtained heading (gray).
To conclude the section, let us present a case of tight
cooperation where our approach can be used, through peri-
odic renegotiation. Figure 8 shows the negotiation of pushing
force and direction between two agents, a wheeled robot and
a legged robot [15]. In this case, the task to be negotiated is
how to push the box in the desired direction. The parameters
of the task are position and force, i.e. a torque to apply for a
fixed period of time∆t, in order to rotate the box towards the
target direction. In this case, periodic renegotiation is needed
because the effect of performing the subtasks modifies the
environment (difference between target and actual direction)
and hence the torques to apply must be recalculated. Figure
9 shows the target direction, the real heading of the box and
the torques agreed at each renegotiation. The legged robot
(Agent 2) can push with a force that is lower than the one
achieved with the wheeled rover, therefore it prefers to stay in
an more extreme position and push less stronger. Again, the
rover does not have any knowledge of that, it simply agrees to
comply with such preferences during the negotiation process.
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Fig. 9. Box pushing experiment. This Figure shows the target and resulting
heading of the box (top curves). The torques agreed in order to reach
the target heading are shown in the two bottom curves. Renegotiation is
performed each ∆t = 3 seconds. At time t = 140 seconds the target
direction is changed (a new task is assigned), and the two agents adapt to
the change of task.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The main contributions of this paper are two. First, we
propose a formal definition of the concept of task, gen-
eral enough that allows expressing different problems. The
negotiation algorithm implemented using such formulation
then applies to a vast variety of multi-robot tasks. Second,
a negotiation protocol that takes advantage on theoretical
results that guarantee some important properties such as
termination and prediction of the outcome.
Experiments conducted in computer simulations show the
effectiveness of the proposed approach, and the adherence of
the numerical results with the theoretical results coming from
game theory. The focus of this work was on loose cooper-
ation. Nevertheless, the simulations on box pushing showed
that our approach can also be adapted for some cases of tight
cooperation problems, through periodic renegotiation of the
tasks, provided that during the time between negotiations
the agents can work almost independently. This means that
the approach wouldn’t work, for instance, on the cooperative
transportation of a body rigidly connected to the robots.
We are currently working on two fronts. On the practical
side, we are deploying the negotiation algorithms on our fleet
of aerial and ground autonomous vehicles for testing with
real robots, and performing tests with different kind of tasks.
Although the results presented refer to simulations, the
first tests on real robots confirm the effectiveness of the
negotiation protocol we propose, which just required the
adjustment of the parameters of the cost function for the
real robots characteristics.
On the algorithmic side, we are studying how to incor-
porate the estimation of the opponents discount factors for
deciding the termination of the negotiations, in the case
R > 2. Moreover, for this case, other extensions are possible,
such as bilateral negotiations and coalitions. In both cases
the negotiation would be reduced to a series of bilateral
negotiations. We are currently exploring these options.
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